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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:147

- ARBITRATION
CPLR 7503(a): Party can stay action without initiating arbitration.
ARTICLE 75

Under CPLR 7503, a party aggrieved by another's failure to arbitrate can move, either in a pending action or in an independent special
proceeding, to compel arbitration. Under CPA 1451, another remedy
a motion to stay the action -was provided for expressly, but the
present statute merely states that granting a motion to compel arbitration automatically stays a pending suit. Did the revision in the law
eliminate the remedy previously available to a party who wishes to
228
stay an action without initiating arbitration proceedings?
In Board of Education v. Delle Cese,229 the Supreme Court,
Oneida County, concluded that the stay is still available to such a
party. Plaintiff had served his complaint after expiration of the time
in which arbitration could have been instituted. Defendant S'Doia

moved for summary judgment, on the ground that a stay was not
available, and later for a stay. The court held that S'Doia was entitled
to a stay but not to summary judgment. 230 It reasoned that the power to
stay is either inherent in CPLR 7503231 or available under CPLR 2201,

which authorizes a court to "grant a stay of proceedings in a proper
case . . . ." A mutual agreement to arbitrate, the court reasoned, is a
proper case. 2
DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW

DRL 210: Time limit is merely a statute of limitations.
Prior to the Divorce Reform Act of 1966, a plaintiff could obtain
a divorce in New York solely on the ground of adultery, if he commenced his action within five years from the date of discovery of the
adultery. 233 This five-year requirement was held to be a statute of
limitations. 28 4 However, under another provision 285 a plaintiff was
obligated to disprove certain possible defenses, of which the elapse of
five years from discovery was one, in the event the defendant de228 See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 7503, supp. commentary at 136 (1965).

229 65 Misc. 2d 473, 318 N.Y.S.2d 46 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1971).
2
30 See 8 WK&M
7503.19. Under CPA 1451, summary judgment was improper, because
a stay was the exclusive remedy. E.g., American Reserve Ins. Co. v. China Ins. Co., 297
N.Y. 322, 79 NXE.2d 425 (1948).
231 65 Misc. 2d at 478, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 51, citing Adelphi Enterprises, Inc. v. Mirpa,
Inc., 33 App. Div. 2d 1019, 307 N.YS.2d 978 (2d Dep't 1970), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 45 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 145, 172 (1970).
232 Id. at 478, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 51-52.
288 DRL 171(3).
234 Ackerman v. Ackerman, 200 N.Y. 72, 93 N.E. 192 (1910).
235 DRL 174, repealed, L. 1966, ch. 254, § 4.

